INTRODUCTION
A contest is a model in which the participants have to exert an effort in order to get a prize. Contests have been applied to very different topics, such as sports, warfare, productive teams, etc.
1 Contests and tournaments have also been suggested as alternative compensation schemes to standard U We thank Dilip Abreu, Francis Bloch, In-Koo Cho, Luis Corchon, Esther Hauk, Rosemarie Nagel, Oved Yosha, an Associate Editor and two referees for helpful comments, and Amy Salsbury for suggesting the title. Serrano acknowledges the hospitality of Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona and the financial support of grant SAB95-0186 from Spain's Ž . Ministry of Education and Science. Spain's Organization for the Blind ONCE also provided research support.
† E-mail: roberto serrano@brown.edu. ᎐ 1 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . See Rosen 1986 , Dixit 1987 , Grossman 1991 , and Skaperdas 1992 , among others. In Ž . addition, Schotter et al. 1996 find experimental evidence that shows that the perceived notion of a fair split in simple bargaining games can be altered by embedding these games Ž . Ž . in a contest. See also Ben-Yossef 1994 and for experiments on intergroup social dilemmas.
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contracts. 2 This paper introduces two main differences with respect to most of the earlier literature on contests. First, our contest is dynamic 3 : it lasts for an arbitrary finite number of periods. Second, our contestants are teams composed of two individuals, rather than individuals themselves.
We shall concentrate on the prisoners' dilemma contest, that is, we Ž . imagine a number of couples at least two simultaneously playing the T-period repetition of the prisoners' dilemma game. Each time a couple Ž cooperates, it scores a point. At the end of the contest, the couple or . couples who have scored the highest number of points receive a small prize. The key aspect of the model is that, by introducing the prize, multiple equilibria arise in the one-shot game, which allows for greater multiplicity in repeated play. Despite the small size of the prize, cooperation may sometimes arise because of the interplay between the ''short run'' payoffs that come from the repeated play, and the ''long run'' payoff that may come at the end of the contest, depending on the couple's relative performance. Therefore, the prize plays the role of the string that ties the contestants' legs in a three-legged race.
The prisoners' dilemma is the classic example of a case in which incentives to cooperate within the team and to cheat on the common effort coexist. For instance, we can think of the teams as being firms competing in a market. 4 Tempted by an immediate increase in their personal satisfaction, members of the firm may choose to shirk their assigned tasks. Alternatively, they may cooperate toward the common goal of making the firm ''the best in the business.'' As a second example, the contest could take place within a firm that organizes its productive activity in teams and rewards the best team at the end of the year. In general, applications to any activity in which the individual incentives and the team's interest are not perfectly aligned might fit our benchmark.
The introduction of the prize represents an arbitrarily small perturbation of the payoffs in the repeated contest when it is a very long one. In this context, we prove an analog of the ''folk'' theorem for repeated games Ž . when subgame perfect equilibrium SPE is the solution concept used. Since our contest has finite horizon, these multiple equilibria cannot be supported by using the techniques for infinitely repeated games. Indeed, our proof of the analog of the ''folk'' theorem is quite close to that of 2 Ž . Ž . Ž . See Lazear and Rosen 1981 , Green and Stokey 1983 , and Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1984 Ž . In a completely different setup, Rosen 1986 also studies a dynamic contest. See also Ž . Ž . Harris and Vickers 1985 and Fudenberg et al. 1983 . 4 Ž . See Leibenstein 1982 for this interpretation.
Ž . Benoit and Krishna 1985 for finitely repeated games. As a function of the size of the prize, the number of couples and the payoffs of the ''stage game,'' we find that the set of per-couple, per-period average SPE payoffs is characterized by some reduction of the set of feasible payoffs. For example, if the prize is very close to zero, the only SPE payoff results from the noncooperative outcome always being played. But as the size of the Ž prize increases while still being negligible with respect to the total payoff . of the contest , ''reduced photocopies'' of the set of feasible payoffs arise in SPE, providing an endogenous measure of the level of cooperation admitted in the model.
To solve the serious indeterminacy of payoffs and taking into account that deviations from one's teammate should not be punished in the same way as deviations from others, we turn to renegotiation within each team and we study a concept based on renegotiation proofness. When the teams do not have immediate information about each other's past performance, a Ž . very small prize compared to the size of the total payoff of the contest Ž suffices to generate a great deal of cooperation in the unique up to . relabeling of teams equilibrium outcome. This result stands in marked contrast to the one we obtain with renegotiations when information about each team's past performance is immediately available to the contestants: there are problems of existence of equilibrium in this case. Those teams that are already front-runners have an incentive to exert the smallest possible effort to win the prize. The pursuers, on the other hand, will only Ž want to exert a cooperative effort if the front-runners do not that is, only . if there is a chance to win . It turns out that the two types of interest Ž cannot be made compatible in the same equilibrium strategy profile not . even allowing for mixed or correlated strategies . Thus our results suggest that the introduction of a small prize encouraging a good relative performance, together with the lack of communication among the contestants, yields an optimal incentive scheme. For example, different sets of coauthors working on the same problem should not know about each other's progress, to avoid the unpredictable behavior derived from learning the news about being a pursuer or a front runner in the race. 5 Is there something like this going on behind the jealous secrecy with which scientists undertake their projects? Alternatively, it is often observed that different research teams working on a parallel project within a firm are not allowed to communicate to each other their intermediate results, despite the positive effects on learning that this may have. 5 Related effects have been described in R & D races. News about being a pursuer results in total discouragement when information is perfect. When there is uncertainty about the productivity of R & D effort, a pursuer in the race may update optimistically its beliefs about Ž . the difficulty of the project ''If someone else can do it, why not me?'' having a positive effect Ž . on its effort see Choi 1991; Tirole, 1988, ch. 10, sect. 2 , and the references therein .
Our way of generating cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' Ž dilemma does not rely on the introduction of irrationality see Kreps et al., . 1982 , with their discussion of reputation , nor is it based on infinite horizon ''folk'' theorem reasoning. 6 Rather, it relies on competition among Ž the couples created by the ''third leg'' the prize awarded to the team's . relative performance .
Finally, we would like to stress a technical point. In the last sections of the paper, we use an equilibrium notion that we call contest equilibrium. This notion is based on renegotiations within each team. The conceptual difficulties in applying the concept of renegotiation proof equilibrium to multilateral settings are well known.
7 Thanks to the special structure of Ž . our model all contestants are organized in two-player teams , we are able to base our analysis on the renegotiations that may take place internally in each of the teams. Our solution highlights the team as the relevant decision unit, in contrast to the standard equilibrium notions of noncooperative game theory, where the individual player is the basic strategic unit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the prisoners' dilemma contest. Section 3 is devoted to the analog of the ''folk'' theorem when SPE is the solution concept used. Our renegotiation-based equilibrium notion is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 contains our results for renegotiation under perfect information. The contest with imperfect information is presented in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. The long proof of one of our results appears in an appendix.
THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA CONTEST
Consider the prisoners' dilemma game, the customary representation of which is
where a -0 and 1 -b. It is well known that this game, if played only once, has a unique Nash ŽŽ .. equilibrium D, D . This prediction is even stronger than that of the standard notion of Nash equilibrium, in that players use dominant strategies. This also constitutes the usual example that illustrates how inefficient 6 Ž . See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986 . Along these lines, stronger results have been proved recently in models with random matching of players and contagious punishments Ž . to deviants when information is heavily restricted see Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994 . 7 In general, it seems rather implausible that a ''big'' grand coalition is the only one able to recontract from a given equilibrium. Intermediate size coalitions should presumably intervene Ž . as well in the renegotiation process. See Farrell and Maskin 1989, p. 355 on this point.
Ž
. from the collective point of view noncooperative game theoretic equilibrium outcomes can be. Furthermore, the inefficiency or lack of cooperation is unaltered when the game is repeated a finite number of times; by Ž . backward induction, any finite repetition of the game yields D, D played every period.
Ž . Ž . We denote by ␥ T the prisoners' dilemma contest, in which n n G 2 Ž . identical couples are playing the T-period T finite repetition of the game above. The total payoff to a player consists of two parts: first, the undiscounted sum of per-period payoffs; and second, a share in a prize that depends on the performance of the couple. The second part of the Ž . payoff is awarded as follows: each time a couple plays C, C they score a point. There is a total prize of 2 nM utils to be given to those couples who Ž have scored more points the prize is split equally between the two members of the couple; similarly, if there is more than one winning couple, . the prize is split equally among them . Namely, for arbitrary strategies Ž . Ž used by all players, the prize to player i player i of couple , i s 1, 2;
. Ž . s1, 2, . . . , n , is snMrW if is one of the W winning couples iŽ .
when players use , and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the total payoff to player Ž . Ž .
offs from the table above.
8
Thus the specification of the prize that we are interested in rewards good relative performance: the prize is given to the team or teams that have shown to be ''better'' than the others. This makes the contest component central to our work, departing from specifications of the prize as a function of the team's absolute performance, i.e., the prize is awarded if the team cooperates for any fraction of the times. In this case, each team can be better seen as ''running against itself'' rather than competing in a contest. Of course, in such a model, a SPE exists where each team cooperates the required number of times, provided that the per-team prize be not smaller than b y 1. 9 We have in mind a more competitive environ-Ž ment an R & D race where the aim is to get the discovery first, for . example ᎏhence the above specification. Harris and Vickers 1985 and Fudenberg et al. 1983 . In these models, the main forces at work are the distance of each competitor from a fixed finish line and the costs of exerting effort. It is thus not surprising that the contest does not differ much from the Ž one-person decision problem at least if one concentrates on pure strategy equilibria. The Ž . . mixed strategy equilibria found in Fudenberg et al. 1983 are more surprising, however . Another difference between these models and our work is that competitors in the race are individual players, not teams.
Ž .
Two other interesting considerations are i the outcomes that may arise in any repeated game when payoffs are specified in a fashion similar to Ž . that above, and ii the results that are obtained by using other specifica-Ž tions of the prize for the case of the prisoners' dilemma see Chou and . Geanakoplos, 1988 , on the former . We briefly discuss the latter in the last section of the paper.
Ž . If M G b y 1 in the one-period contest ␥ 1 , in contrast to the oneperiod prisoners' dilemma game, there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria: Ž . Ž . let any number k of couples 0 F k F n play C, C and the other n y k Ž . 10 couples play D, D . Thus the introduction of the prize and the consequent competition among teams or couples may turn the prisoners' dilemma game into an unpredictable contest. This multiplicity is central to our results.
A VARIANT OF THE ''FOLK'' THEOREM
A larger number of equilibria may be found in the T-period contest Ž . ␥ T provided that T is large enough, even after ruling out those Nash equilibria based on incredible threats. This is the content of our first result: we prove an analog of the ''folk'' theorem for the contest model. Recall that the ''folk'' theorem for finitely repeated games requires stage Ž games with at least two distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs Benoit and . Krishna, 1985 . Thus the prisoners' dilemma is not covered under the Benoit᎐Krishna result.
Since our main motivation is an alternative explanation for cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game, we shall concentrate on the per-couple, per-period average payoff. That is, one could think of a planner concerned with the average efficiency of a market and how this would be affected by the introduction of the prize that awards good relative performance. This way of measuring payoffs will allow us to state our results in a parsimonious manner. We next introduce a few pieces of notation.
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Let V be the convex hull of the points 1, 1 , a, b , b, a and 0, 0 . Let V * ; ‫ޒ‬ 2 be the subset of V with strictly positive coordinates. Furthermore, given a constant k, 0 -k -1, denote by kV * the set of payoffs k¨, Ž where¨g V * that is, kV * is the reduced copy of V * where k is the . factor of reduction . Given a strategy profile and its associated final Ž . payoffs in ␥ T , we shall denote by¨the per-period average payoff of Before we begin with the proof, let us explain the intuition behind Proposition 1. Although the prize may be negligible with respect to the Ž . total payoffs of the contest, it is ''big enough'' to make C, C a Nash equilibrium in the last period subgame played by a front-runner team. This multiplicity of equilibria created in the last period is behind the large multiplicity of SPE payoffs.
Proof of Proposition 1. We cannot have SPE with more than w winning teams who at least cooperate once. If we had such an equilibrium, a player in one of the winning teams would have an incentive to play D rather than Ž . C in the last period they are supposed to play C, C . That is, by definition Ž . Ž . of w, nMr b y 1 -w q 1, which can be rewritten as 1 q nMr w q 1 -b, which means that a player in one of the winning teams would find the deviation to D profitable. Therefore, if in equilibrium there are winning Ž . teams that play C, C at least once, their number is at most w. On the Ž . other hand, it is easy to check that all nonwinning teams will play D, D Ž . for the whole duration of the contest ␥ T .
Ž . Ž . Next we argue that given any wrn¨g wrn V *, there exists T large Ž . enough such that we can find a SPE of ␥ T whose per-couple, per-period Ž . average payoff is arbitrarily close to wrn¨. This is done as follows: first Ž . of all, n y w teams will play D, D from beginning to end, and therefore they contribute 0 to the per-couple average payoff. On the other hand, we will find SPE strategies that for each of the w winning couples yield a per-period average payoff of¨.
Let¨g V * be an arbitrary feasible payoff for each winning couple. Clearly, there exist four nonnegative constants ␣ , ␣ , ␣ , and
DD Ž Then, as a function of ⑀ the precision with which we want to approxi-. mate¨, there exist four positive integers T , T , T , and T , whose
T rT Ј, and ␣ ( T rT Ј. deviations have occurred, we attach T Љ further periods where these w Ž . teams play C, C in each of them, where T Љ is chosen below.
For player i s 1, 2 in each winning couple and given the above strategies, denote by¨t the total payoff that player i will receive in the first T Ј i periods starting in some period t. That is,¨t is almost player i's continuai Ž tion payoff in the subgame that starts in period t almost because it does . not count the payoff in the last T Љ periods . Then, choose T Љ large enough such that for all t -T Ј and for i s 1, 2:
This choice of T Љ can always be made. Then we claim that the above actions constitute the equilibrium path of a SPE. More formally, the Ž . strategies of this SPE of ␥ T are:
Ž . I A player in a nonwinning team plays D regardless of history.
Ž .
II A player in a winning team conforms to the above described behavior. Following a deviation by a player in one of the winning teams, play D regardless of history from that point until the end of the contest.
To see that these strategies constitute a SPE, notice first that players in the nonwinning teams have no incentive to deviate. Because of the way we Ž chose T Љ, no player in the winning teams will deviate either notice that . b q nM is an upper bound for a one-period deviation payoff . Finally, no player in the winning teams will want to deviate in the final T Љ periods of cooperation.
These strategies are therefore a SPE. The problem is that, because we have added the final T Љ periods of cooperation, the per-period average payoff for each winning couple is not¨. However, consider a contest in which the first T Ј periods are repeated k times for k sufficiently large. That is, players play according to the above strategies for T Ј periods; next they do the same for T Ј periods more, and so on for k times. At the end of these kT Ј periods, we attach the T Љ periods of cooperation. Notice that as k grows we approximate arbitrarily closely the average payoff¨for each winning couple. Furthermore, this continues to be a SPE under the above k Јt Ž inequality. To see this, denote by¨the excluding the tail of cooperai . tion continuation payoff for player i in the subgame that starts in period
Therefore, to deter deviations in the first phase of kT Ј periods, we must have¨k
Ž . i i
Since¨) 0 because¨g V U , this inequality holds for the same T Љ that i was chosen above. Therefore, the above strategies are a SPE of the contest
Choosing k as large as desired, we can approximate¨as the per-period average payoff for each winning couple. Since each nonwinning couple will Ž . always play D, D , the result follows. B Ž . Remark. If nMr b y 1 -2, only equilibria with one winning couple can be sustained. As a result, the nonwinning teams never cooperate and the winners need not exert a lot of effort to win the contest. Thus the prediction is quite close to that of the standard finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We omit the details. The careful reader is invited to perform the analysis.
Ž .
Remark. Because of the introduction of the prize, the contest ␥ T is a Ž . stochastic 2 n -player game, not purely a repeated game. We should then ask what feasible payoffs of the stochastic game can be supported by SPE. The constructed SPE in the proof of Proposition 1 is symmetric across Ž . winning couples in the sense that player i receives the same payoff for every winning couple .
If one wishes to characterize the set of SPE per-period average payoffs Ž . that arise in the contest ␥ T , one needs to construct asymmetric equilibria across winning couples. Then it can easily be shown that, under the Ž . assumption of Proposition 1 i.e., when multiplicity of SPE payoffs arises , with strategies similar to those in the proof, the set of per-period average Ž . SPE payoffs of ␥ T can be characterized as follows. For each of the wЈ winning couples, 2 F wЈ F w,¨g V *, such that
where in the convex combination a s a for each of them. As before, CC, CC Ž . each nonwinning couple receives 0, 0 .
Remark. The number of winning couples w should be interpreted as the maximum level of cooperation allowed in the contest given the Ž parameters of the model the number of couples, the size of the prize, and . the incentives to cheat in each prisoners' dilemma game . If this contest were representing a market composed of firms, w would be a measure of the maximum number of profitable firms that the market admits.
The equilibria of Proposition 1, however, are not very reasonable in this context. If one of the players in a couple is stubborn enough to play D always, the prize component in the payoffs is not activated, and hence the predictions given by SPE cannot be interpreted as the ones that would emerge from a contest. As in a three-legged race, this suggests that the real decision unit should be the team, not the individual player. In the next section we introduce an equilibrium concept that takes into account these considerations.
COUPLE RENEGOTIATIONS AND CONTEST EQUILIBRIUM
A large multiplicity of SPE payoffs is typically found in a repeated game, provided it is played many times and players' preferences put enough weight on the future.
11 Many of these SPEs, however, do not seem self-enforcing, as they leave room for renegotiation between the players. Consider the following example:
Ž . Suppose this game is played twice in a row. The payoff 3, 3 can be supported as a SPE payoff of this two-period game. Strategies that support Ž . Ž . it are to play D, R in the first period and U, L in the second. But either player could argue against this equilibrium on the following grounds:
Ž . ''Why should we play U, L in the second period? There is a self-enforcing Ž . Pareto improvement that could be made: to play D, R in the second period instead is also a Nash equilibrium in that subgame. Therefore, let's Ž . renegotiate away from this SPE and play D, R also in the second period.'' That is, the proposed strategy profile is not a renegotiation proof equilib-Ž . Ž . rium RPE . In fact, the unique RPE is D, R played every period. The concept of RPE formalizes this idea of self-enforcing Pareto improve-12 Ž . ments. Next we adapt the definitions of Benoit and Krishna 1993 to our model.
Given a strategy profile for all players in the contest, we denote by Ž . Ž . the strategies corresponding to the players 1 and 2 of couple ; and by t the strategies corresponding to players in couples other than .
y Fix a strategy subprofile and consider the T-period game
induced on couple , where h s л is the null y Ž history at the beginning of the contest. By convention, we count the 11 Ž We have in mind results like that in the earlier section see also Benoit and Krishna, 1985 , for games of finite horizon and Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986 ing to an arbitrary .
Ž . Consider the last t periods 1 F t F T of this induced game, that is,
. This is the game that consists of the t-period repetition of y tq1 Ž . the prisoners' dilemma, following a history h up to but not including Ž . period t and where the reward component in the payoffs for player i ,
. the couple play according to an arbitrary h .
The following definitions use a recursion on the number of periods left in the contest. We try to construct an equilibrium that no couple can renegotiate away. Ž . w Ž< 2 . x Let t s 1 last period of play and denote by P ␥ 1 , h the set of y Ž < 2 . 13 Ž 2 . SPE of the game ␥ 1 , h . Given a pair of strategies h g y
the vector of final payoffs y y
where eff. denotes the Pareto frontier of y w Ž < 2 .x the set in braces. Then, denote by Q ␥ 1 , h the subset of y w Ž < 2 .x Ž Ž 2 . . U Ä w Ž < P ␥ 1 , h , which yields payoffs U h , ., . g U P ␥ 1 , y y 2 . x 4 w Ž < 2 . x w Ž < 2 .x h ; and let R ␥ 1 , h s Q ␥ 1 , h . y y Ž . w Ž Ž < tq1 .x Let t G 2 the final t periods of play and denote by P ␥ t , h y Ž < tq1 . w Ž < tq1 .x the set of SPEs of the game ␥ t , h . Denote by Q ␥ t , h y y w Ž < t q 1 . x the subset of P ␥ t , h whose continuation paths are genery w Ž < t .x ated by strategy pairs in R ␥ t y 1 , h . Finally, denote by y
the set of RPEs of the game ␥ T y T q 1 . 14 ,h . y Ž . D EFINITION. A contest equilibrium s ; s 1, 2, . . . , n is a stratw Ž < Tq 1 .x egy profile such that for all couples , g R ␥ T , h . y 13 Ž . Benoit and Krishna 1993 define the sets P, Q, and R as sets of payoffs. It will be more convenient for us to define them directly as sets of strategies. 14 Ž . Note that, unlike in Benoit and Krishna 1993 , all of these definitions are not based solely on backward induction. The prize component in payoffs makes it necessary that the past history of play appear.
Two remarks are in order before we begin the analysis of the contest with this equilibrium notion. Suppose that the contest is played under conditions of perfect information, so that every couple is able to observe and remember everyone else's Ž performance at any point in time of course, they can observe and . remember their own past performance as well .
Our first result in this section does not consider correlation of the player's strategies within a team and is as follows. 
w x
In part a , when there is only one period, the contest exhibits several Ž . Nash equilibria, but only one up to relabeling of teams satisfies our definition of contest equilibrium: each winning couple wants to run more than the others to get the prize. As a consequence, all end up cooperating. w x On the other hand, the nonexistence of part b has a nice economic interpretation. If the contest gets to a situation in which one of the couples has taken a lead, the front runners do not want to exert too much effort, just enough to win the contest. So, if they do not cooperate, the underdogs have an incentive to cooperate and tie the contest. Of course, the front 15 Ž . See Benoit and Krishna 1993 . On the other hand, in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, the notions of RPE proposed in the literature do not solve the indeterminacy Ž . created by the ''folk'' theorem see Farrell and Maskin, 1989 . 16 Unless the prize is awarded only if the couple cooperates every single period. Then cooperation arises, but the economic content of the model is less appealing.
runners would then cooperate, in which case the underdogs would throw in the towel, and so on. Ž . expected prize to player i if the couple plays anything else. Then if ␣ Ž . is the probability with which j plays C, the indifference condition Ž . between C and D for player i is
Ž . Notice that the same condition holds for 1 and for 2 . The expected Ž . payoff to player i , i s 1, 2, in the mixed strategy equilibrium is then Ž . Ž . ␣bq 0, . Since C, C is an equilibrium, it must be the case that 
III Notice that mixed strategies do not restore existence. If couple 1 Ž . Ž . plays C, C with positive probability, we can argue as in I . If one of the players in couple 1 is randomizing and the other is playing D, we can argue Ž . as in II .
Of course, if T ) 2, the T-period contest contains a subgame in which one of the couples gets to the last period having scored one more point Žthis subgame may be either on or off the equilibrium path, but we should . be able to write down equilibrium strategies in it . Thus there is no contest equilibrium. B Remark. Nowhere in the proof is it assumed that equilibria are symmetric across couples. Thus the proof shows something stronger: the statements are true for per-period average contest equilibrium payoffs, i.e., Ž . there are no asymmetric across winning couples contest equilibria. An identical remark applies to Proposition 3 in the next section. w x The nonexistence result of part b is related to similar problems in the Ž cooperative theory where reasonable solution concepts like the core are . Ž often empty or in coalitional concepts in normal form games such as . strong or coalition-proof Nash equilibria . In the same subgame used in the proof, existence is not restored, even after allowing for correlation of the strategies within a team. If the random device used to correlate strategies is publicly observed by the two teams, arguments similar to those in the proof show that there is no possibility for an equilibrium. Moreover, even if partial observability of the realizations of the random device is the Ž only thing allowed, there is no equilibrium based on correlation we have in mind an equilibrium concept that replaces the requirement of Nash equilibrium with correlated equilibrium in every subgame played by each . team . For example, suppose the random device has four possible realiza-Ž .Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . tions: C, C , C, C with probability p 1 ; C, C , D, D with probability Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž . p 2 ; D, D , C, C with probability p 3 ; and D, D , D, D with probability Ž . p 4 . Suppose that the first pair of actions describes what the front runners should do and the second is the play by the pursuers. Suppose that the ŽŽ . front runners' information structure among the four outcomes is 1, 2 , Ž .. ŽŽ . Ž .. 3, 4 , while the pursuers' is 1, 3 , 2, 4 . Then, it can be checked that the conditions on the equilibrium yield an incompatible system of inequalities:
for the front runners to play
for the front runners to play D 1 q p 3 Mr p 1 q p 3 G b for the pursuers to play C Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
1 q p4M r p2 q p4 -b for the pursuers to play D.
Existence is obtained in the version of the contest where teams move sequentially one after the other according to a fixed protocol in every period. However, cooperation does not result. For instance, the reader can check that if n s 2 and for M G b y 1, if the horizon T is very large, we Ž . have that both teams play D, D in all periods except in the very last ones, Ž . in which they play C, C . The intuition is similar to the nonexistence in the simultaneous game. That is, when observability of the past is perfect, there are incentives to save any unnecessary effort. Thus the possibility of renegotiation within each team does not help cooperation in this case. As we shall see, matters are different if imperfect observability is introduced. 17 
THE CONTEST WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
In this section we analyze the T-period contest with imperfect informa-Ž . tion denoted by ␥ Ј T . We suppose now that the players of each couple observe only their own play until the end of the contest. Notice that if we employ SPE as the solution concept, the same conclusions as in Proposition 1 are reached. The only difference is that, following a deviation, the punishment must be carried out by the partner in the team by always playing D. With this small difference, the strategies are the same as in the proof of Proposition 1. A more interesting conclusion is reached when we use our renegotiation-based contest equilibrium.
Clearly, the induced game on couple , given a strategy subprofile ,
, where h denotes couple 's history up to but not y . including period t. The sets P, Q, and R are defined for any t recursively as before. Similarly, in the definition of contest equilibrium, substitute the w
for the earlier expression. Teams know that it is worthwhile to cooperate because the prize is attractive toward the final periods of the contest. Thus, for any behavior of the other teams that the players of a team could forecast, they bet on being the winners of the race by cooperating more than they. Moreover, this original plan cannot be upset by news learned after the contest has begun, as there is no such news. Hence the cooperative outcome arises.
Ž . See Abreu et al. 1991 for a different model of partnerships in which restricting information also has positive effects for cooperation.
Proof of Proposition 3. See Appendix. 17 As pointed out by a referee, the existence problem would go away if the prize is meant to reward absolute performance of the couple: as discussed in Section 2, this model is just a compound of n independent two-player games. Thus interplay across couples does not exist.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the prisoners' dilemma contest with imperfect information, we have shown that the cooperative outcome is the only one compatible with renegotiation proofness within each team. Each team always wants to score more points than the others, leading to a situation in which all winning teams cooperate from beginning to end. We stress that this result is achieved with a prize that can be made arbitrarily small with respect to the total payoffs of the contest.
On the other hand, the negative result of Proposition 2b does not go away by making the prize arbitrarily large: the front runners will always save any unnecessary effort. If the prize is made an increasing function of the difference in points between front runners and pursuers, the cooperative outcome also arises with renegotiation under conditions of perfect information, because of the incentive to keep scoring points. With such a specification of the prize, a large multiplicity of SPE similar to that of Proposition 1 arises. In this case, the exact statement of the result, however, may be highly sensitive to the exact specification of the prize function.
Ž If the contest has infinite periods or finite periods with an uncertain last . period , play could be divided into T-period ''stages.'' At the end of each stage the couples with a lower number of points could be eliminated, thereby capturing an idea of ''market survival.'' Although this formulation might yield similar results with SPE, the renegotiation-based ones could be highly sensitive to the adopted notion of renegotiation proofness.
Finally, we should remark that the prisoners' dilemma is not special in any respect. That is, if one considers the T-period long contest based on the repetition of a game with a unique Nash equilibrium payoff that is inefficient, similar results can be derived if a prize is awarded to those Ž teams that score the highest number of points where a point is given each time the team executes actions that are efficient and Pareto dominate the . Nash equilibrium .
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3. For notational simplicity, we shall write the proof for the case w s n. In the case w -n, the arguments to show that the nonwinning couples never cooperate are very similar to those in the proof of Proposition 1. In fact, one can prove something stronger than Ž . stated, namely, that every winning couple will play C, C from beginning to end of the contest, regardless of the horizon T. We thus write the proof of this for the case w s n.
First we will show that the contest equilibrium is unique, and that it consists of paths in which, in every period, each couple chooses either Ž . Ž . the action combination C, C or D, D and no player randomizes.
Ž . Ž . Let K t be the number of times that the pair has played C, C in Ž . periods T, T y 1, . . . , t. Set K T q 1 s 0. Fix a couple and let t s 1.
Ž .
Ž . Ž . Consider the subgame played by 1 and 2 , given and K 2 .
y
The strategy subprofile induces a probability distribution over the y number of times that each couple Ј / plays the action combination Ž . C, C . With this probability distribution, we can calculate the expected Ž . Ž . prize awarded to player i as a function of K 1 . We will denote this Ž Ž .
. payoff by K 1 , 1, , where the first argument indicates the iŽ . y Ž . number of times that couple has played C, C already including period t, and the second is the period of play where players are. w x ÄŽ .Ž . 4 a Suppose that there exists an equilibrium ␣, 1 y ␣ , ␣, 1 y ␣ of this subgame in which both players choose action C with probability ␣. ŽIt is easy to verify that, if both players randomize, they must use equal . weights. Then, it must be true that
Ž . Suppose next that C, C is not an equilibrium of the same subgame. Then it must be true that
Ž . However, if 2 holds, then 1 is violated. Therefore, if there exists an Ž . equilibrium for this subgame where both players randomize, then C, C must also be an equilibrium. Ž . Ž Since the payoffs associated with C, C Pareto dominate for the couple . ÄŽ . those associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium, ␣, 1 y ␣ , Ž . 4
y w x b Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in the same subgame where Ž . Ž . player i plays C with probability ␣, 0 -␣ -1, and j plays C. Then the following conditions must hold:
Ž . Ž . Ž . Combining 3 and 4 , we obtain ␣ ya G ya. Hence such an equilib-Ž . rium cannot exist recall that a -0 . w x c Suppose there is an equilibrium in the same subgame in which player Ž .
Ž . i plays C with probability ␣ , 0 -␣ -1, and j plays D. Clearly, if Ž .
Ž . j plays D, i must play D with probability 1, which is a contradiction. w x w x w x Steps a , b and c imply that in the subgame that we are considering, Ž . Ž . the couple will play either the action combination C, C or D, D .
Consider the following induction hypothesis: suppose that for any y Ž . Ž t . w X Ž < t .x and for any K t or h , the set R ␥ t y 1 , h is a singleton, y Ž . consisting of a sequence of t y 1 terms that are only action pairs C, C Ž . and D, D .
This implies that after period t there is a unique continuation path compatible with the renegotiation proofness requirement, and therefore the continuation payoffs are uniquely determined. Denote these payoffs by Ž Ž . .
. Using the induction hypothesis, the reader can easily iŽ . y verify that in period t the only action combinations compatible with Ž . Ž . renegotiation proofness are either C, C or D, D . To see this, it suffices w x w x w x to replace in steps a , b , and c the first argument of the continuation Ž . payoff function with K t q 1 , and the second argument with t.
Next we turn to existence. Let be a contest equilibrium profile. Since we know that no player randomizes in equilibrium, for any couple , we Ž . can define S to be the number of times that the couple plays the Ž . action pair C, C in .
Ž . We claim that the unique contest equilibrium of the game ␥ Ј T is described by the following four statements:
Ž . For any t s 1, 2, . . . , T, for any s 1, 2, . . . , n, for any i :
We will prove this claim by induction on the number of periods left. Let t s 1. w x Ž . a Suppose that K 2 q 1 -x . This means that even if couple Ž . played C, C in period 1, their prize would be 0. Therefore, in this case, 
This means that even if the players in Ž . played D, D , each one would get the highest possible prize nM. There-
y w x w x Suppose, by induction, that conditions 1 ᎐ 4 hold in every period from 1 to t y 1. We must show that they hold in period t. . Ž w x. K t q t y 1 s x , and by the induction hypothesis part 2 , the couple Ž . would play C, C until the end. Each player in would get a payoff of 0 in period t, and a continuation payoff of t y 1, plus a share of nM. Ž . Ž . Ž . If played C, C , then K t q t y 1 s x q 1, and by the induction Ž w x. Ž . hypothesis part 3 , would play C, C until the end of the game. Each player in would get a payoff of 1 in period t, and a continuation pay-Ž . off of t y 1 plus a prize of nM. If i deviated and played D in period t, Ž . Ž . Ž w x. then K t q t y 1 s x , and by the induction hypothesis part 2 , he would get a payoff of b in period t and a continuation payoff of t y 1 plus a share of nM. By assumption, nM y nMr2 ) b y 1. Ž . Hence, it follows that every couple plays C, C from beginning to end, no matter how long the contest is. This completes the proof. B
